

## **DOUBLE STANDARDS AND A NEW ERA OF THE RADICAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA: A STUDY OF THE FRONT PEMBELA ISLAM (FPI)**

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### **Abstract**

*This study aims to analyze the various attitudes and movements executed by the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam/FPI), a religious organization in Indonesia. Based on the conclusions of several scholars, FPI is categorized as one of the radical mass organizations that emerged after the reformation. This research uses a qualitative approach. Data collection was conducted by interviewing key figures of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), web information searching, literature review on FPI's attitudes and movements. The analysis used was thematic analysis, involving steps such as familiarizing with the data, initial coding, reviewing and refining the themes, and writing the report. This study concludes that FPI uses double standards in carrying out its movements. In various forums, they claim to be loyal to Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), but the vision and mission do not mention the word Pancasila, instead it mentions the word Khilafah. FPI's double standards, as well as the practical preaching performed, have made FPI a radical mass organization that has the highest support in Indonesia. FPI also plays a role in the contemporary Islamism movement, such as the widespread application of the Shari'ah Regional Regulation, as well as the politicization of religion in the 2017 Jakarta Pilkada and the 2019 Presidential Election. Double standards, preaching practices, as well as the politicization of religion have brought Indonesia to an era which the author calls a new era of radical Islamic movement in Indonesia. This era has the potential to spread religious radicalism in Indonesia in a smoother manner, which could be more dangerous compared to more overt actions, such as the open attempts to establish a caliphate.*

**Keywords:** *Double Standards; New Era of Radical Islamic Movement; Islamic Defenders Front; Islamism; Radical Mass Organizations*

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## Abstrak

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis berbagai sikap dan gerakan yang dilakukan oleh Front Pembela Islam (FPI), sebuah organisasi keagamaan di Indonesia. Berdasarkan kesimpulan beberapa cendekiawan, FPI dikategorikan sebagai salah satu organisasi massa radikal yang muncul setelah reformasi. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif. Pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan mewawancarai tokoh Front Pembela Islam (FPI), mencari informasi di web, serta tinjauan pustaka mengenai sikap dan gerakan FPI. Analisis yang digunakan adalah analisis tematik, melalui langkah-langkah seperti memahami data, pengkodean awal, meninjau dan memperbaiki tema, serta menulis laporan. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa FPI menggunakan standar ganda dalam menjalankan gerakannya. Dalam berbagai forum, mereka mengklaim setia kepada Pancasila dan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI), tetapi visi dan misi mereka tidak menyebutkan kata Pancasila, melainkan menyebutkan kata Khilafah. Standar ganda FPI, serta dakwah praktis yang dilakukan, telah menjadikan FPI sebagai organisasi massa radikal dengan dukungan tertinggi di Indonesia. FPI juga berperan dalam gerakan Islamisme kontemporer, seperti penerapan luas Peraturan Daerah Syari'ah, serta politisasi agama dalam Pilkada Jakarta 2017 dan Pemilihan Presiden 2019. Standar ganda, praktik dakwah, serta politisasi agama telah membawa Indonesia ke era yang penulis sebut sebagai era baru gerakan Islam radikal di Indonesia. Era ini berpotensi menyebarkan radikalisme agama di Indonesia dengan cara yang lebih halus, yang bisa jadi lebih berbahaya dibandingkan dengan sikap dan tindakan frontal, seperti upaya terang-terangan menolak Pancasila, sekaligus mendirikan Negara Islam (khilafah).

**Kata Kunci:** Standar Ganda; Era Baru Gerakan Islam Radikal; Front Pembela Islam; Islamisme; Organisasi Massa Radikal

## مستخلص

يهدف هذا البحث إلى تحليل المواقف والحركات المختلفة التي تقوم بها جبهة المدافعين الإسلاميين (FPI)، وهي منظمة دينية في إندونيسيا. واستنادًا إلى استنتاجات بعض الباحثين، تُصنف FPI كإحدى المنظمات الجماهيرية الثورية التي ظهرت بعد الإصلاح السياسي. ويستخدم هذا البحث نهجًا نوعيًا. تم جمع البيانات من خلال إجراء المقابلات مع الشخصيات من جبهة المدافعين الإسلاميين (FPI)، والبحث عن المعلومات على شبكة الإنترنت، بالإضافة إلى مراجعة الأدبيات المتعلقة بمواقف وحركات FPI. والتحليل المستخدم هو التحليل الموضوعي، من خلال الخطوات مثل فهم البيانات، والترميز الأولي، ومراجعة الموضوع وتحسينه، وكتابة التقرير. ويخلص هذا البحث إلى أن FPI تستخدم المعايير المزدوجة في تنفيذ تحركاتها. وفي مختلف المحافل، تزعم أعضاؤه بأنهم موالون للمبادئ الخمسة الإندونيسية والدولة الموحدة لجمهورية إندونيسيا (NKRI)، ولكن رؤيتهم ورسالتهم لا تذكر كلمة للمبادئ الخمسة الإندونيسية، بل تذكر بدلاً من ذلك كلمة الخلافة. وإن المعايير المزدوجة لـ FPI، وكذلك دعوتها العملية، جعلت من FPI منظمة جماهيرية ثورية تتمتع بأعلى مستوى من الدعم في إندونيسيا. فتدور FPI أيضًا دورًا في الحركات الإسلامية المعاصرة، مثل التطبيق الواسع النطاق للوائح الإقليمية الشريعة، فضلًا عن تسييس الدين في انتخاب رؤساء المناطق بجاكرتا لعام ٢٠١٧ وانتخابات الرئاسة الإندونيسية لعام ٢٠١٩. فالمعايير المزدوجة، وممارسات الدعوة، وتسييس الدين لقد أدخل إندونيسيا إلى عصر يسميه المؤلف عصرًا جديدًا من حركة الإسلام الثورية في إندونيسيا. وإن هذا العصر يحمل في طياته القدرة على نشر التطرف الديني في إندونيسيا بطرق أكثر دقة، والتي قد تكون أكثر خطورة من المواقف

والأفعال الأمامية، مثل الجهود العلانية لرفض المبادئ الخمسة الإندونيسية، في حين  
تعمل في الوقت نفسه على إنشاء الدولة الإسلامية (الخلافة).  
الكلمات الرئيسية: المعايير المزدوجة؛ عصر جديد للحركة الإسلامية الثورية؛  
جبهة المدافعين الإسلاميين (FPI)؛ الإسلامية؛ المنظمة  
الجماهيرية الثورية

## A. Introduction

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is one of the most researched religious organizations by scholars at home and abroad. Various studies on FPI generally confirm the conclusion of its existence as a radical, dangerous mass organization, and a threat to democracy. For example, Faiz mentioned the religious violence committed by FPI is caused by immaturity in understanding religion.<sup>1</sup> Facal stated that the dimensions of morality considered by FPI legitimize massive acts of violence.<sup>2</sup> Syaefudin said that the FPI preaching model through the slogan *amarma'ruf nahimunkar*, raises public fear, and causes human rights violations.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, Wilson stated that the alliance of several Indonesian political forces with FPI is a serious threat to the development of democracy in Indonesia.<sup>4</sup>

Some scholars, such as Duile and Jahroni, have taken a slightly different approach to researching FPI. Duile does not focus on the radical FPI movement, but on its success in mobilizing large numbers of people in 2016, by utilizing social media.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, Jahroni explained in more detail the existence of FPI from a sociological aspect. Jahroni saw that public support for FPI is not only due to religious motives, but also because of the social and economic pressure of urban Muslim communities.<sup>6</sup>

The various examples of research mentioned above have not analyzed the contemporary development of FPI in terms of double standards in executing its actions. Wilson, Duile, and Facal's research did look at the contemporary FPI movement. However, these various studies only looked at the movement's strategy from the aspects of social media and politics. It is possible that an excessive focus on the actions of the FPI has caused these scholars to overlook the significant ambivalence within the FPI. These various ambivalences are what led us to propose the thesis of double standards within the FPI. This thesis is also what distinguishes this

<sup>1</sup> Fachrudin Faiz, "Front Pembela Islam: Antara Kekerasan Dan Kematangan Beragama.," *KALAM* 8, no. 2 (2014): 347.

<sup>2</sup> Gabriel Facal, "Islamic Defenders Front Militia (Front Pembela Islam) and Its Impact on Growing Religious Intolerance in Indonesia.," *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and-National Studies of Southeast Asia* 8, no. 1 (2020): 7–20.

<sup>3</sup> Machfud Syaefudin, "Reinterpretasi Gerakan Dakwah Front Pembela Islam (FPI).," *Jurnal Ilmu Dakwah* 34, no. 2 (2014): 259.

<sup>4</sup> J.D Wilson, "Resisting Democracy: Front Pembela Islam and Indonesia's 2014 Elections.," *ISEAS Perspective* 10, no. 1 (2014): 1.

<sup>5</sup> Timo Duile, "Islam, Politics, and Cyber Tribalism in Indonesia: A Case Study on the Front Pembela Islam.," *International Quarterly for Asian Studies* 48, no. 3–4 (2017): 249.

<sup>6</sup> Jajang Jahroni, "Defending The Majesty of Islam: Indonesia's Front Pembela Islam (FPI) 1998-2003.," *Studia Islamika* 11, no. 2 (2004): 198.

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study. This study aims to delve deeper into the various movements within the FPI. This effort has uncovered several ambivalences in their actions. These ambivalences have led us to conclude that the FPI operates with double standards.

The thesis is about the escalation of understanding and radical Islamic movements in Indonesia which is different from Fealy's point of view. Fealy said that the spread of radical Islam had failed in Indonesia. The failure to spread radical Islam conveyed by Fealy in 2009 was based on the empirical facts of the bankruptcy of the media used to spread their beliefs such as *Panji Masyarakat* and *Sabili* in 2003.<sup>7</sup> Some scholars said that the failure to spread radicalism was due to the country's success in creating a negative stigma against radicalism, as well because of the tolerant character of the majority of Indonesians.<sup>8</sup> In our view, the scholars' claims of the State's success in countering religious radicalism appear simplistic. Social and cultural developments may lead to changes or flexibility in strategies employed. This is evident in the various ambivalences of FPI, as discussed in this study. The flexibility in FPI's strategies could pose a more serious threat to the sustainability of national life.

Although Fealy concluded the failure of the spread of radical Islam in Indonesia, based on the Freedom House record, the title of Indonesia has decreased from a free country to a half-free country in the last seven years.<sup>9</sup> The reduction is based on Muslim intolerance towards non-Muslims, as well as intolerance towards minority religious groups and ideologies. For example, violence against Syiah, Ahmadiyah, Lia Eden, Gafatar, worshipers, churches burning, and demands for religious blasphemy against Ahok.<sup>10</sup> In addition, problems related to radical Islam can also be seen from the widespread application of the *Shari'ah* Regional Regulation (Perda), as well as the use of ethnicity, religion and race issues in the 2017 DKI Pilkada and the 2019 Presidential Election.<sup>11</sup>

Numerous contemporary phenomena above encourage the author to conclude that there has been an increase in the escalation of understanding and radical Islamic movements in Indonesia. More than that, the increasing escalation of radical Islamic movements marks the

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<sup>7</sup> Greg Fealey, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?," *Southeast Asian Affairs* 1, no. 1 (2004): 117.

<sup>8</sup> Paul J Carnegie, "Countering the (Re-) Production of Militancy in Indonesia: Between Coercion and Persuasion.," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9, no. 5 (2015): 15–26; J Burhanudin and Van Dijk, *Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting Images and Interpretations*. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014); Fathor Rahman, "Menakar Kembali Akar Ideologi Ormas Radikal-Fundamentalis (Studi Kasus Terhadap Front Pembela Islam (FPI).," *AL Iman: Jurnal Keislaman Dan Kemasyarakatan* 1, no. 2 (2017): 287–311.

<sup>9</sup> Saeful Mujani, "Explaining Religio-Political Tolerance Among Muslims: Evidence from Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* 26, no. 2 (2019): 220.

<sup>10</sup> Mujani, 220.

<sup>11</sup> Ahmad Fuad Fanani, "The Implementation of Sharia Bylaws and Its Negative Social Outcome for Indonesian Women.," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 7, no. 2 (2017); Nanang Hasan Susanto, "Politicization of Religion and the Future of Democracy in Indonesia in Populism Theory.," *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 18, no. 54 (2019).

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entry of an era which the author calls “a new era of the radical Islamic movement in Indonesia”. This new era can be seen from the changes in the movement’s strategy. Previously, radical groups with frontal mentioned the ideals of establishing an Islamic caliphate, and at the same time considered the Indonesian government as secular and infidel.<sup>12</sup> The radicalist movement in the new phase only demanded total implementation of *Shari’a*, while at the same time claiming to remain loyal to Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). More than that, they claim that the movement they are doing is to practice Pancasila.<sup>13</sup>

Community organizations that are the main support for the rise of the *Shari’a Perda* and bring religious issues to the 2017 DKI Pilkada and the 2019 Presidential Election are the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI).<sup>14</sup> Although the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict said that Rizieq’s departure to Saudi has weakened FPI, due to its central position, the fact is that the FPI movement has not receded; instead it has become a symbol of the rise of radical Islam in Indonesia today. The popularity of FPI also tends to be the highest compared to other radical mass organizations.<sup>15</sup> One of the FPI strategies, which claim to be loyal to Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia, could be an effective strategy to attract sympathy from the masses. The motivation behind FPI’s strategy could be to garner mass sympathy, due to the government’s success in providing a negative stigma for supporters of the caliphate, labeling them as radicalists, ignorant, and anti-moderate. In fact, according to surveys, FPI’s popularity tends to be the highest compared to other radical organizations in Indonesia.<sup>16</sup>

The dissolution of the FPI by the government through a Joint Decree of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Ministry of Communication and Informatics, Chief of the Indonesian National Police (Kapolri), and Indonesia’s National

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<sup>12</sup> Z Abuza, “Muslims, Politics, and Violence in Indonesia: An Emerging Jihadist-Islamist Nexus?,” *NBR Analysis* 15, no. 3 (2004): 5–55; Greg Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam*. (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004); Martin Van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” *South East Asia Research* 10, no. 2 (2002): 117–54; A Bubalo and Fealey Greg, *Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East, and Indonesia*. (Washington DC: The Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World, 2005); G Eliraz, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Global and Historical Contexts,” *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 38, no. 1 (2004): 123–71; Wright Neville, “Dangerous Dynamics: Activists, Militants and Terrorists in Southeast Asia,” *Pacific Review* 17, no. 1 (2004): 27–46.

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Abu Ayas, Head of Da’wah Department IDF Pekalongan, Former chief of IDF Pekalongan 2003-2018), August 2, 2019.

<sup>14</sup> Mata-mata Politik, “Kebangkitan FPI Dan Perannya Mendorong Hukum Syari’ah Di Indonesia,” January 16, 2020, <https://www.matamatapolitik.com/kebangkitan-fpi-dan-perannya-mendorong-hukum-syariah-di-indonesia>; Tempo.co, “Enam Lembaga Rilis Hasil Survei Pilkada DKI, Ahok Unggul,” January 29, 2017, <https://pilkada.tempo.co>; Antara, “PA 212, FPI, Dan GNP Gelar Ijtima Ulama Pada Agustus 2019,” July 16, 2019, [https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1224943/pa-212-fpi-gnpf-gelar-ijtima-ulama-pada-agustus-2019?TerkiniUtama&campaign=TerkiniUtama\\_Click\\_1](https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1224943/pa-212-fpi-gnpf-gelar-ijtima-ulama-pada-agustus-2019?TerkiniUtama&campaign=TerkiniUtama_Click_1).

<sup>15</sup> Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), *Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), Survei Opini Publik: Toleransi Masyarakat Indonesia (Jakarta: LSI, 7 Agustus 2006)*, h. 15 (Jakarta: LSI, 2006), 15; Greg Barton, “The Historical Development of Jihadi Islamist Thought in Indonesia. Edited by Scott Helfstein, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point.,” *Radical Islamic Ideology In Southeast Asia*, 2009, 114.

<sup>16</sup> Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), *Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), Survei Opini Publik: Toleransi Masyarakat Indonesia (Jakarta: LSI, 7 Agustus 2006)*, h. 15, 15; Barton, “The Historical Development of Jihadi Islamist Thought in Indonesia. Edited by Scott Helfstein, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point.,” 114.

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Counter terrorism Agency (BNPT) as of December 30, 2020 implies its existence as a dangerous organization. Several FPI movements that were considered controversial and often involved in crimes became the reason for the government to dissolve the organization. Deputy Minister of Law and Human Rights Hiariej even said that 35 members or who had joined FPI were involved in acts of terrorism. More than that, FPI is also said to support the ISIS movement, especially in the aspect of upholding Islamic law.<sup>17</sup> This paper will discuss more deeply about FPI, especially the double standards applied in its movement.

### **B. Discussion**

#### ***1. Radical Islam and its Geneology in Indonesia***

The issue of radical Islam is a social phenomenon that has caught the attention of scholars recently. The number of articles discussing radical Islam elevates several terms that are similar and overlap one another.<sup>18</sup> For example, there are terms *fundamentalism* (refers to religious views that believe in the fundamental or basic principles of the religion, which cannot be changed, including by modernity.), *hard line* (emphasizes an extreme religious attitude in realizing what is believed.), *scripturalism* (emphasizes the sacredness of religious texts), *Salafism* (refers to the movement to restore the early era of Islam, which is considered ideal), *wahabism* (The religious purification movement pioneered by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1703–1792), *revivalism* (in Islamic tradition, usually refers to the movement to restore the past glory of Islam), *transnational Islam* (refers to the movement to call for the unity of all Muslims in the world to establish a caliphate), etc. which all have overlapping meanings between one another.<sup>19</sup>

Although the terms used are often overlapping, there are some common characteristics that the radical Islamic movement exhibits. According to Asroni, the general characteristics are absolutist, scripturalist, opportunistic, puritanical and radical.<sup>20</sup> According to Marty as quoted by Nadia, the characteristics of radical Islam are oppositionalism, rejection of hermeneutics, rejection of pluralism and relativism, and rejection of historical and sociological

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<sup>17</sup> Razdkanya Ramadhanti, "Ramadhanti, Razdkanya. 'PemerintahPutar Video FPI Dukung ISIS.', 30 Desember 2020, in <https://www.dream.co.id/news> (Diakses tanggal 14 January 2021)." December 30, 2020, <https://www.dream.co.id/news>.

<sup>18</sup> John L Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); S Bakri, "Islam Dan Wacana Islam Radikal Kontemporer," *Jurnal Dinika* 3, no. 1 (2004): 1–8; Vedi R Hadiz, "Towards A Sociological Understanding of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 38, no. 4 (2008): 638–47.

<sup>19</sup> Syamsul Arifin and Hasnan Bachtiar, "'Deradikalisasi Ideologi Gerakan Islam Transnasional Radikal,'" *Harmoni* 12, no. 3 (2013): 19–36.

<sup>20</sup> Ahmad Asroni, "Radikalisme Islam Di Indonesia: Tawaran Solusi Untuk Mengatasinya.," *Jurnal Religi* 7, no. 1 (2008): 15–34.

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developments.<sup>21</sup> On another occasion, Fealy characterized radical Islam as a belief in implementing religious teachings completely without compromise, as well as being reactive to secularism, communism, liberalism and groups that obstruct their mission.<sup>22</sup>

Although radical groups have different aspects of the organization and their thoughts<sup>23</sup>, there are general characteristics that equate these differences. The characteristic that unites these differences is the effort to implement Islamic *shari'a* totally<sup>24</sup>. All radicals from any group believe that if *shari'a* is stipulated as the official law of the State, then all the problems of the Nation will be resolved.<sup>25</sup>

The attitude of the radicals mentioned above is a form of problem simplification. The nation's problems are so complex and complicated related to social, cultural, economic, unemployment, education, etc., the solution is simplified only by the jargon of *shari'a* or *khilafa*.<sup>26</sup> Ba'asyir, for example, said that the multidimensional crisis that hit this nation was due to the many sins and the reluctance to apply His *Shari'a*.<sup>27</sup> On another occasion, Rizieq said that the large tsunami that hit Aceh in 2004 was due to sins committed by the people.<sup>28</sup> Besides being simplistic, Rizieq's statement is difficult to accept because since 2001, Aceh has implemented Sharia Regional Regulations (Perda Syari'at). The implementation of these Sharia Regulations at least reflects the formal adherence of the Acehnese people to Islam.

Radicalism actually occurs in almost all major religions in the world.<sup>29</sup> Syam once mentioned that the term radicalism originally appeared in the west in the twentieth century, as a Protestant Christian movement against the influence of modernity.<sup>30</sup> In its development, the term radical has been shown more in Islamic countries, through the ideals of applying Islamic

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<sup>21</sup> Zunly Nadia, "Akar-Akar Radikalisme Islam Dalam Tafsir Fi Zillal Al-Qur'an Karya Sayyid Qutb.," *Jurnal Mukaddimah* 18, no. 2 (2012): 303–4.

<sup>22</sup> Fealey, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?," 106.

<sup>23</sup> Rubaidi, "Variasi Gerakan Radikal Islam Di Indonesia.," *Analisis: Jurnal Studi Keislaman* 11, no. 1 (2011): 33–52.

<sup>24</sup> Abuza, "Muslims, Politics, and Violence in Indonesia: An Emerging Jihadist-Islamist Nexus?"; Barton, *Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam*.; Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia."; Bubalo and Fealey Greg, *Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East, and Indonesia*.; Eliraz, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Global and Historical Contexts."; Neville, "Dangerous Dynamics: Activists, Militants and Terrorists in Southeast Asia."

<sup>25</sup> Zaenal Abidin, "Wahabisme, Transnasionalisme Dan Gerakan-Gerakan Radikal Islam Di Indonesia.," *Tasamuh* 12, no. 2 (2015): 145; Endang Syaifudin Anshari, *Ilmu, Filsafat Dan Agama*. (Surabaya: PT Bina Ilmu Offset, 2002), 93.

<sup>26</sup> Susanto, "Politicization of Religion and the Future of Democracy in Indonesia in Populism Theory." 154.

<sup>27</sup> Anshari, *Ilmu, Filsafat Dan Agama*., 93.

<sup>28</sup> Saeful Anwar, "Pemikiran Dan Gerakan Amr Ma'rûf Nahy Munkar Front Pembela Islam (FPI) Di Indonesia 1989-2012.," *Teosofi: Jurnal Tasawuf Dan Pemikiran Islam* 4, no. 1 (2014): 230.

<sup>29</sup> Hezliansyah, "Radikalisme Agama Ada Di Hampir Tiap Agama.," May 22, 2012, <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/12/05/22/m4ehvy-radikalisme-agama-ada-di-hampir-tiap-agama>; Muhammad Genantan Saputra, "Selain Di Islam, Kelompok Radikal Juga Ada Di Agama Lain.," February 19, 2018, <https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/selain-di-islam-kelompok-radikal-juga-ada-di-agama-lain.html>.

<sup>30</sup> Nur Syam, *Radikalisme Dan Masa Depan Hubungan Agama-Agama: Rekonstruksi Tafsir Sosial Agama*. (Surabaya: IAIN Sunan Ampel Press, 2010), 7.

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law totally, replacing official state law which is considered secular.<sup>31</sup> In connection with this phenomenon, it is interesting to discuss genealogy of radical Islamic movements in the Islamic world.

According to Kachan, genealogy of radical Islam cannot be separated from the call for the unity of Muslims throughout the world (Pan Islamism) Jamaludin Al-Afghani in the 19th century. This call was motivated by a desire to break away from colonial rule, where almost all Islamic countries at that time were in the grip of the colonialists.<sup>32</sup> Al-Afghani's ideas are interpreted differently from one group to another. In the extreme way, there are two groups of interpreters who contradict one another.

The first group said that Muslims must rise through intellectual power to gain glory, and get out of the grip of the colonialists.<sup>33</sup> The characteristics of this group usually call for the desacralization of religious texts, give full trust to reason vis a vis revelation, and are not uncomfortable adopting western culture and ideas such as the Nation State, democracy, human rights etc. In contrast to the first group, getting out of the grip of the colonizers according to the second group must be done by imitating the best generation (*salafussalih*), which historically has proven to bring Islam to the pinnacle of civilization. Therefore, this group calls for the revitalization of the sacredness of the text, the total application of Islamic law, and rejects all ideas that come from the West.<sup>34</sup> The thought of the second group gave birth to the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin) with Hasan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, Jama'at Islamiyah with the character Said Abu al-Maududi in Pakistan.<sup>35</sup> Both of these groups have a religious understanding that tends to be radical, because it legitimizes acts of violence to implement Islamic *shari'ah*. More than that, Al-Maududi, who called for the separation of Pakistan from India to form an Islamic government, was the founder of the basic theory of "Islamic State".<sup>36</sup> During its development, IkhwanulMuslimin and Jama'at Islamiyah had an influence on the Muslim world community, including in Indonesia.

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<sup>31</sup> Eric Hiarij, "Aksi Dan Identitas Kolektif Gerakan Islam Radikal Di Indonesia.," *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik* 14, no. 2 (2010): 131–68; Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal, Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras*. (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 17.

<sup>32</sup> Konstantin Kachan, "Evolution of Islamic Radicalism during the 19th to 21st Centuries." *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 17, no. 49 (2018): 107–8.

<sup>33</sup> Ismail Raji Al-Faruqi, *The Essence of Islamic Civilization*. vol. 21 (Pennsylvania: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2013); Mohammed Arkoun, *Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers*. (New York: Routledge, 2019).

<sup>34</sup> Fealey, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?"; Nadia, "Akar-Akar Radikalisme Islam Dalam Tafsir Fi Zillal Al-Qur'an Karya Sayyid Qutb."; Rahm, "'Menakar Kembali Akar Ideologi Ormas Radikal-Fundamentalis (Studi Kasus Terhadap Front Pembela Islam (FPI)).'"

<sup>35</sup> Kachan, "Evolution of Islamic Radicalism during the 19th to 21st Centuries." 111.

<sup>36</sup> Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*. (Los Angeles: Barkley, 1960), 217.

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In addition, the radical Islamic movement is also said to be influenced and developed from the Wahabi movement in Saudi Arabia, which was inspired by the thoughts of Ibn Taimiyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Djauziah.<sup>37</sup> Although followers of this movement prefer to be called the *salafi* movement, this movement is better known as Wahabi by taking the name of its founder Muhammad Abdul Wahab.<sup>38</sup> This movement was born in the 18th century in Saudi Arabia with the aim of purifying Islamic teachings from *shirk*, *bid'ah*, *khurafat* and superstition.<sup>39</sup> Similar to IkhwanulMuslimin and jama'atIslami, the Wahabi movement believes that the decline of Muslims is due to the fact that their followers do not practice Islam completely.

In the 1960s, there was intensive cooperation between the Ikhwanul Muslimin and Wahabi groups to spread their understanding and teachings throughout the world. Ikhwanul Muslimin and Wahabi are two radical groups that complement each other. The Muslim Brotherhood is known as an educated group but lacks funding, while the Wahabi supported by the Arab kingdom are known as a group that has strong funding, but is less educated.<sup>40</sup> The intensive cooperation of the two groups was quite successful in spreading their ideology throughout the world, by building organized wings and networks.<sup>41</sup> The intensive cooperation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahabis, coupled with the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, made Islam experience a religious boom throughout the world, which at a certain stage gave rise to radical Islam. Southeast Asia especially Indonesia is not an exception. In the Southern Philippines, the radical Abu Sayyaf group emerged. In Malaysia, the Malaysian Mujahidin Association (KKM) emerged.

In Indonesian context, this religious boom began to appear in the 1900s. At this time, the use of religious symbols was seen as the rampant use of veils, recitation in hotels, the rise of Islamic music, and the proliferation of book publications with Islamic nuances.<sup>42</sup> This phenomenon is very different from the previous decades, where people who use Islamic symbols are synonymous with poverty, backwardness, anti-progress and development.<sup>43</sup> In the

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<sup>37</sup> Abidin, "Wahabisme, Transnasionalisme Dan Gerakan-Gerakan Radikal Islam Di Indonesia.," 137.

<sup>38</sup> Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement.," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (2006): 207–39.

<sup>39</sup> David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), vi.

<sup>40</sup> Jajang Jahroni, "Saudi Arabia Charity and the Institutionalization of Indonesian Salafism.," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 58, no. 1 (2020): 36.

<sup>41</sup> Abdurrahman Wahid et.al, *Abdurrahman Wahid Dkk, Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional Di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Gerakan Bhineka Tunggal Ika, The Wahid Institute, Maarif Institute, 2009), 83 (Jakarta: Gerakan Bhineka Tunggal Ika, The Wahid Institute, Maarif Institute, 2009), 83.

<sup>42</sup> Riki Rahman and Faisal S Hazis, "ICMI and Its Roles in the Development of the Middle Class Muslim Communities in Indonesia in the New Order Era," *Al-Jami'ah Journal of Islamic Studies* 55, no. 2 (2018): 347–51.

<sup>43</sup> F.K. Daud, "Jilbab, Hijab Dan Aurat Perempuan (Antara Tafsir Klasik, Tafsir Kontemporer Dan Pandangan Muslim Feminis).," *Al-Hikmah: Jurnal Studi Keislaman* 3, no. 1 (2013): 1; M.R.J. Vatikiotis, "Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the Banyan Tree.," *Annals-American Academy of Political and Social Science* 1, no. 560 (1998): 207.

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post-1900s, religious boom was also marked by the birth of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* (ICMI) which made the political power of Islam to be reckoned with in Indonesia.<sup>44</sup>

After the fall of the New Order, the explosion of religion became increasingly unstoppable, and even gave birth to various mass organizations that tended to be radical.<sup>45</sup> During this period, mass organizations were born such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI), Laskar Jihad (LJ), Islamic Community Forum (FUI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Jama'ah Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia, Preparatory Committee Implementation of Islamic *Shari'ah* (KPPSI), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and others.<sup>46</sup> Some scholars state that the development of radical Islam in post-New Order Indonesia cannot be separated from external (transnational) and domestic influences.<sup>47</sup> According to Bruinessen, outside influence is in the form of support from several countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Pakistan. Meanwhile, the influence from within is a continuation of the radical ideology that has emerged since the beginning of Indonesian independence, namely the rebellion movement to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII),<sup>48</sup> and the Islamic party that was dissolved by the Old Order namely Masyumi.<sup>49</sup>

### **2. FPI and Radical Islam**

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is one of the Islamic organizations that were born after the New Order. Due to its ideology and various movements, the majority of scholars categorize FPI as a radical mass organization.<sup>50</sup> Azra called FPI a scriptural symbolic organization<sup>51</sup>. Zada mentioned several reasons for categorizing FPI as a radical mass organization, namely: fighting for the application of Islamic *Shari'ah* in total, idolizing the early generations of Islam in religious practice, anti-western with all its products such as democracy, modernization and secularization, and resistance to liberalism.<sup>52</sup> Various indicators

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<sup>44</sup> Rahman and Hazis, "ICMI and Its Roles in the Development of the Middle Class Muslim Communities in Indonesia in the New Order Era," 341–42.

<sup>45</sup> Martin Van Bruinessen, *Introduction Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam and the 'Conservative Trun' of the Early Twenty-First Century.*, 1–20 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013).

<sup>46</sup> Abidin, "Wahabisme, Transnasionalisme Dan Gerakan-Gerakan Radikal Islam Di Indonesia.," 141; Hiariej, "Aksi Dan Identitas Kolektif Gerakan Islam Radikal Di Indonesia.," 131–32.

<sup>47</sup> Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia.," 118; Achmad Muzaki, "The Roots, Strategies and Popular Perception of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia.," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 8, no. 1 (2014).

<sup>48</sup> Azyumardi Azra, "Kartosuwiryo Dan NII: Kajian Ulang.," *Studia Islamika* 21, no. 1 (2014): 175.

<sup>49</sup> Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia.," 149.

<sup>50</sup> Arifin and Bachtiar, "Deradikalisasi Ideologi Gerakan Islam Transnasional Radikal.," Rahman, "Menakar Kembali Akar Ideologi Ormas Radikal-Fundamentalis (Studi Kasus Terhadap Front Pembela Islam (FPI).," Azyumardi Azra, "Muslim Indonesia: Viabilitas 'Garis Keras.," *Gatra*, 2000, 263; Zada, *Islam Radikal, Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras.*, 263; Endang Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi, *Islam Dan Radikalisme Di Indonesia.* (Jakarta: LIPI Pres, 2005).

<sup>51</sup> Azra, "Muslim Indonesia: Viabilitas 'Garis Keras.," 263.

<sup>52</sup> Zada, *Islam Radikal, Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras.*, 17.

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categorizing FPI as a radical Islamic mass organization, as mentioned by the scholars above, in our opinion, make it difficult for FPI to avoid this categorization.

Although many scholars categorize FPI as a radical mass organization, some parties, especially from internal FPI, object to being called “radical”.<sup>53</sup> FPI prefers to call itself “Muslim activists” rather than fundamentalists or radicals.<sup>54</sup> FPI’s objection to being called radical seems to be influenced by the negative stigma that the authorities have successfully discussed.<sup>55</sup> According to Habermas, quoted by Forchtner language is of interest.<sup>56</sup> Therefore, the “radical” language which in Indonesian Dictionary has a neutral meaning is a party that is very hard on demanding fundamental changes.<sup>57</sup> In its development, it has a pejorative meaning. This makes groups labeled as “radical” uncomfortable.

Unlike the radical mass organizations in Indonesia in general, FPI has its roots in traditional Islamic religious traditions such as Nahdlatul Ulama. Various traditional Islamic religious rituals in Indonesia, such as *tahlil* (praying for the dead) and *muludan* (celebrating the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad) and others are also implemented by FPI.<sup>58</sup> RizieqShihab as the highest leader of FPI even criticized Salafi-Wahabi thinking that discredited the religious traditions of *tahlil*, *muludan* and others.<sup>59</sup> This similarity between FPI and traditional Islam had Arifin and Bachtiar said that it is rather difficult to categorize FPI as a transnational radical mass organization such as Laskar Jihad (LJ), Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah Communication Forum (FKAWJ), Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (LMI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), and Jamaah Islamiyah (JI)<sup>60</sup>.

Despite having traditional religious understanding (Ahlusunnahwaljama’ah), FPI’s understanding of Ahlusunnahwaljama’ah is different from mainstream NU mass organizations.<sup>61</sup> If NU generally follows the al-Asy’ari and al-Maturidi mazhab in the field of aqidah, FPI refuses to only adhere to these two figures. According to FPI, following in the footsteps of the best early generations of Islam (*salafussaleh*) must be done totally, without

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<sup>53</sup> Muh. Shodiq, Interview with Muh. Shodiq (Head of Hizbah Department IDFPekalongan), at his house., September 30, 2019; Ainul Yakin, “Beda Radikal Dengan Radikalisme,” September 1, 2015, <https://www.hidayatullah.com/artikel/ghazwul-fikr/read/2015/09/01/77270/beda-radikal-dan-radikalisme-2.html>.

<sup>54</sup> Hiariej, “Aksi Dan Identitas Kolektif Gerakan Islam Radikal Di Indonesia,” 154; Anshari, *Ilmu, Filsafat Dan Agama*.

<sup>55</sup> Fealey, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?,” 118.

<sup>56</sup> Bernhard Forchtner, “Jürgen Habermas’ Language-Philosophy and The Critical Study of Language,” *Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines* 4, no. 1 (2010): 18–37.

<sup>57</sup> KBBI, “Radikal,” accessed March 27, 2023, <https://kbbi.web.id/radikal>.

<sup>58</sup> M. Kholid Syeirazi, “NU Dan FPI Dalam Tiga Matra,” May 22, 2017, <https://www.nu.or.id/opini/nu-dan-fpi-dalam-tiga-matra-Ezdcq>.

<sup>59</sup> Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, ““After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda In Indonesia.”” (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2018).

<sup>60</sup> Arifin and Bachtiar, ““Deradikalisasi Ideologi Gerakan Islam Transnasional Radikal.”” 27.

<sup>61</sup> Rahman, ““Menakar Kembali Akar Ideologi Ormas Radikal-Fundamentalis (Studi Kasus Terhadap Front Pembela Islam (FPI).”” 307.

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separation.<sup>62</sup> The enthusiasm to follow in the footsteps of the early generations of Islam carried out by FPI led scholars to conclude that FPI followed Ja'far Umar Tholib's religious understanding more, as the leader of the *Ahlusunnah Wal Jama'ah* Communication Forum (FKAWJ) rather than NU.<sup>63</sup> FKAWJ Ja'far Umar Tholib himself claims to be a salafist *ahlusunnahwaljama'ah* and follows the thoughts of Sheikh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi and Syekh Mufti al-Hadi Husain.<sup>64</sup>

Based on the phenomena described above, it can be seen that FPI's thinking is quite unique. On the one hand, it can be seen that FPI has many similarities with radical transnational mass organizations such as in the aspects of the struggle for the implementation of Islamic *syari'a* in total, anti-West, opposition to the government, and resistance to liberalism. On the other hand, in contrast to transnational radical mass organizations that want the establishment of an Islamic State, FPI claims to remain loyal to Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia. On the one hand, FPI admits that *AhlussunahWaljama'ah*, at the same time carries out traditionalist religious traditions such as *muludan*, *tahlilan* etc., but on the other hand rejects the reference to the mainstream *ahlusunnahwaljama'ah* in Indonesia, and prefers to be in line with Ja'far Umar Tholib as The Communication Forum of *Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah* (*Forum Komunikasi Ahli Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah*/FKASW) leader.

Apart from the various uniqueness of FPI above, what cannot be denied is the categorization of FPI as a radical mass organization. Besides the suitability of the characteristics of radical Islam shown by FPI as described above, various radical actions taken by FPI show this aspect of radicalism. For example, seen in the action of "anti-immoral operations," which were carried out by forcing the closure of entertainment venues, closing food stalls that were open during the day in the month of Ramadan, sweeping liquor, raids on Commercial Sex Workers (CSWs), and even beating people who do not fast Ramadan.<sup>65</sup>

The government's decision to dissolve FPI is of course based on its consideration as a radical and dangerous mass organization. This decision is a Joint Decree signed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Ministry of Communication and Informatics, Chief of the Indonesian National Police (Kapolri), and Indonesia's National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) as of December 30, 2020. Various FPI movements that are

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<sup>62</sup> Rahman, 308.

<sup>63</sup> Anwar, "Pemikiran Dan Gerakan Amr Ma'rûf Nahy Munkar Front Pembela Islam (FPI) Di Indonesia 1989-2012."; Rahman, "'Menakar Kembali Akar Ideologi Ormas Radikal-Fundamentalis (Studi Kasus Terhadap Front Pembela Islam (FPI)).'"

<sup>64</sup> Barton, "The Historical Development of Jihadi Islamist Thought in Indonesia. Edited by Scott Helfstein, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point." 115.

<sup>65</sup> Rubaidi, "Variasi Gerakan Radikal Islam Di Indonesia."

deemed controversial and often involved in crimes are the reason for the government to dissolve the organization. Deputy Minister of Law and Human Rights, Hiariej said that 35 members or who had joined FPI were involved in acts of terrorism. More than that, FPI is also said to support the ISIS movement, especially in the aspect of enforcing Islamic law.<sup>66</sup>

### **3. *Getting to Know the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) Movement***

FPI's stance cannot be separated from the meeting of the ulama on August 17, 1998 at the Al Umm Ciputat Islamic boarding school, Tangerang. The meeting was attended by National Ulama such as K.H. CecepBustomi (son of the famous Banten Kiai, KH Bustom), HabibIdrusJamalullail (Mubalig and Grand Imam of NurulAbrar Mosque Jakarta), K.H. Damanhuri (Mubalig and Head of Islamic Boarding School, SawanganBaru, Depok City), Habib Muhammad RizieqSyihab, K.H. MisbahulAnam (MuqaddamTarekatTijanni and Head of Al-Umm Islamic Boarding School, Ciputat, South Jakarta), etc. The meeting of the Ulama which coincided with the 53rd Anniversary of RI was claimed to be a form of concern for various problems of the Nation. The meeting also agreed to form a forum for the benefit of the Nation called the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). HabibRizieqSyihab has been appointed as the Grand Imam (chairman) until now. The meeting was subsequently used as FPI's anniversary.<sup>67</sup>

Although it was only officially declared on August 17, 1998, the embryo of a movement carrying Islamic symbols had appeared before, for example, intensive communication by the ulama, hearings to the government, *Tabligh Akbar*, and demonstrations (Jamhari and Jahroni 2004: 129-130). Hamim, quoted by Anwar, said that various radical Islamic movements including FPI, were inspired by militant movements in the Middle East and other countries, such as Jabhat-Tahrir al-Falistini in Palestine, PalestiniLibration Front (PLF) in Palestine, Moro National Libration (MNLF) in the Philippines and Lascar Jundullah in Jakarta.<sup>68</sup>

The FPI action that received public attention for the first time was an attack on a student who was carrying out a demonstration against B.J. Habibie as President of the Republic of Indonesia in November 1998. In the same month, FPI also attacked Christian security guards from Ambon at a gambling complex in Ketapang, Jakarta. After that, FPI began to aggressively attack a number of entertainment venues such as bars, discotheques, cafes, billiards, etc. in a number of regions in Indonesia. Political support is also often shown by FPI to various parties,

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<sup>66</sup> Ramadhanti, "Ramadhanti, Razdkanya. 'PemerintahPutar Video FPI Dukung ISIS.', 30 Desember 2020, in <https://www.dream.co.id/news> (Diakses tanggal 14 January 2021)."

<sup>67</sup> Tata Sukayat, "Radikalisme Islam Atas Nama Dakwah Hisbah Front Pembela Islam.," *Ilmu Dakwah: Academic Journal for Homiletic Studies* 12, no. 1 (2018): 7.

<sup>68</sup> Anwar, "Pemikiran Dan Gerakan Amr Ma 'rûf Nahy Munkar Front Pembela Islam (FPI) Di Indonesia 1989-2012."

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both the executive and the legislature, who have the initiative to implement Islamic law at both the regional and central levels.<sup>69</sup> On the other hand, FPI often attacks various parties who reject the application of Islamic law. On this basis, a number of groups consider the FPI movement to be a movement with political nuances.<sup>70</sup>

Apart from the various controversial actions above, FPI is also often actively involved in humanitarian actions, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, landslides and others that have occurred in Indonesia.<sup>71</sup> Carnegie (2015) quoting the International Crisis Group (ICG), said that this social action was a strategy to gain mass sympathy. Apart from the motives behind the aid, various humanitarian actions carried out by FPI could be a determining factor behind the high popularity of FPI compared to other radical mass organizations.<sup>72</sup>

The FPI organization has five Special Bodies, namely: Front Investigation Agency (BIF), Anti-Terror Agency (BAT), Front Cadre Agency (BPF), Front Expert Body (BAF), Front Agency (LDF), Front Economic Institute (LEF), Front Legal Aid Institute (BHF), Ma'siat Front Monitoring Agency (PMF), and Front Humanitarian Institution called HilalMerah Indonesia (HILMI). Apart from that, FPI also has four Autonomous and Independent Subsidiaries, and has AD/ART, organizational structure, line of command, work programs and its own accountability, namely: LaskarPembela Islam (LPI), MujahidahPembela Islam (MPI), Islamic Student Front (FMI), and Front Workers Union (SPF).<sup>73</sup> Of the many organizations affiliated with FPI, the one that drew the public's attention was the Islamic Defenders Army (LPI). This is due to sweeping actions that are often carried out at nightclubs, gambling centers, etc. Members who enter as LPI are given classroom education to anticipate various things that can happen in the field.<sup>74</sup>

FPI has a vision and mission of implementing Islamic *Shari'ah* totally (*kaffah*) according to under the auspices of the Khilafah Islamiyyah of Manhaj Nubuwwah, through the implementation of Da'wah, upholding Hisbah and Practicing Jihad.<sup>75</sup> The explanation of the vision and mission is that the *Kaffah* Application of Shari'ah is the application of Islamic law in all areas of life, namely faith, worship, *munakahat* (marriage), *muamalat* (social interaction)

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<sup>69</sup> Murod Al-Barbasy Ma'mun, "Islam Dan Negara: Perdebatan Dalam Pembuatan Perda Syariah Di Kota Tasikmalaya.," *Afkaruna: Indonesian Interdisciplinary Journal of Islamic Studies* 12, no. 2 (2016): 223.

<sup>70</sup> Setiawan Zudi, "Dinamika Pergulatan Politik Dan Pemikiran Formalisasi Syariah Pada Era Reformasi.," *Spektrum* 5, no. 2 (2008): 79.

<sup>71</sup> Khoirun Niam, "Ormas Islam Dan Isu Keislaman Di Media Massa.," *Jurnal Komunikasi Islam* 4, no. 2 (2014): 246-47.

<sup>72</sup> Barton, "The Historical Development of Jihadi Islamist Thought in Indonesia. Edited by Scott Helfstein, *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.*"

<sup>73</sup> "FPI's Memorandum and Article of Association (AD/ART)," n.d.

<sup>74</sup> Interview with Muh. Shodiq (Head of Hizbah Department IDFPekalongan), at his house.

<sup>75</sup> "FPI's Memorandum and Article of Association (AD/ART)."

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and *Jinayat* (criminal law). The meaning of the *Kaffah* application of Islamic *Sharia'ah* itself is the obligation to carry out Islamic *Shari'ah* individually, in the life of the Community and the State. The meaning of the Islamic Caliphate is the implementation of a unity of economic, political, defense, social, education and legal systems in the Islamic world.<sup>76</sup>

In addition, FPI's vision and mission also mandates to play an active role in the effort to uphold the 'Alamiyyah Islamic Caliphate' according to Islamic *Shari'ah*. The steps are: First, Encouraging the improvement of the Function and Role of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Second, Encouraging the formation of a Parliament with the Islamic World. Third, Encouraging the formation of a Common Market in the Islamic World Fourth, Encouraging the formation of a Joint Defense Pact in the Islamic World. Fifth, to encourage the unification of the Islamic world currency. Sixth, Encouraging the elimination of passports and visas between the Muslim world. Seventh, Encouraging ease of marriage assimilation between the Muslim world. Eighth, Encouraging the uniformity of the Islamic World Religion & General Education curriculum. Ninth, Encouraging the creation of a Joint Communication Satellite for the Islamic World. Tenth, Encouraging the establishment of the International Islamic Court.<sup>77</sup>

To realize this vision and mission, FPI has guidelines for the struggle of Allah SWT as God, Muhammad SAW as an example, Al-Qur'an as a guide, jihad as a way of life, and martyrdom as its aspiration. FPI has a fighting slogan "Live Noble or Die of a martyr". FPI's fighting motto is: "The struggle of righteousness must be limited, because unsystematic righteousness struggle is defeated by a systematically unrighteousness struggle. In this regard, FPI's fighting philosophy is: "For Mujahid, being slandered is normal, being killed is a martyr, being imprisoned is' Uzlah, and being thrown out is Tamasya". FPI's organizational fighting doctrine: "Sincerate the intention, starting from yourself, the truth must be upheld, everyone must die, and the mujahid are above their enemies."<sup>78</sup>

In carrying out its various actions, FPI often uses the idiom "*Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar*, Commanded Good, and Prevented Evil." *Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar* itself is an idiom that is very familiar to Muslims, because it is a phrase that is not separated from one another, and is mentioned up to 9 times in the Al-Qur'an. This idiom is generally understood by Muslims as an effort to propagate goodness and fight against evil.<sup>79</sup> In the name of *Amar Ma'ruf Nahi*

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<sup>76</sup> "FPI's Memorandum and Article of Association (AD/ART)."

<sup>77</sup> "FPI's Memorandum and Article of Association (AD/ART)."

<sup>78</sup> "FPI's Memorandum and Article of Association (AD/ART)."

<sup>79</sup> Kusnadi and Zuhilmi Zulkarnain, "Makna Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar Menurut Muhammad Asad Dalam Kitab The Message of The Qur'an.," *Wardah: Jurnal Dakwah Dan Kemasyarakatan* 18, no. 2 (2017): 96-97.

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*Munkar*, FPI carried out sweeping night entertainment venues, localization of prostitutes, gambling centers etc. Rizieq as the high priest of FPI claims, *Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar* has become an icon and is identical to the existence of FPI.<sup>80</sup> Ayas, former head of FPI Pekalongan 2003-2018 said that all mainstream mass organizations in Indonesia are too busy with social, education, etc., so they forget about the aspects of *Ama Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar*. Therefore, the existence of FPI fills an empty space that many large mass organizations in Indonesia have forgotten.<sup>81</sup>

### 4. FPI's Radical Islamic Double Standard

Like other radical mass organizations, FPI intends to implement Islamic *shari'ah* totally. Even so, there are several distinctions that differentiate FPI from other radical mass organizations in Indonesia. For example, although FPI dreams of implementing Islamic *syari'a* totally, they do not want an Islamic state. According to RizieqShihab (chairman of the FPI since its establishment until now), there is no divine command to establish an Islamic State (Khilafah Islamiyah) (Shihab, 2000: 115). The objection to establishing an Islamic State was also strengthened by the recognition of FPI, that they accept Pancasila as the basis of the State, and at the same time do not want the disbandment of the Republic of Indonesia.<sup>82</sup>

FPI's reluctance to establish an Islamic State is an interesting one. This is because the majority of scholars' writings that raise the issue of radical Islam almost all relate to efforts to establish an Islamic State.<sup>83</sup> According to the radicals, it is impossible to implement Islamic *syari'at* without first establishing an Islamic State. That is why Islam and politics are inseparable from one another.<sup>84</sup> More than that, politics that is understood is politics based on rigid doctrine, free from compromise and interpretation<sup>85</sup> so that sometimes it legitimizes acts of violence to realize their dreams.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Lalu Rahadian, "Rizieq Klaim FPI Jadi Ikon Amar Maruf Nahi Munkar.," August 19, 2017, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20170819113311-20-235805/rizieq-klaim-fpi-jadi-ikon-amar-maruf-nahi-munkar>.

<sup>81</sup> Interview with Ayas, Head of Da'wah Department IDF Pekalongan, Former chief of IDF Pekalongan 2003-2018

<sup>82</sup> Shodiq, Interview with Muh. Shodiq (Head of Hizbah Department IDF Pekalongan), at his house.; Yakin, "Beda Radikal Dengan Radikalisme."

<sup>83</sup> Abuza, "Muslims, Politics, and Violence in Indonesia: An Emerging Jihadist-Islamist Nexus?"; Barton, *Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam.*; Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia."; Bubalo and Fealey Greg, *Between the Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East, and Indonesia.*; Eliraz, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Global and Historical Contexts."; Neville, "Dangerous Dynamics: Activists, Militants and Terrorists in Southeast Asia."

<sup>84</sup> Zuly Qodir, "Gerakan Salafi Radikal Dalam Konteks Islam Indonesia: Tinjauan Sejarah.," *Islamica: Jurnal Studi Keislaman* 3, no. 1 (2008): 14.

<sup>85</sup> Azyumardi Azra, "Memahami Gejala Fundamentalisme.," *Jurnal Ulumul Qur'an* 4, no. 3 (1993): 5.

<sup>86</sup> A Rubaidi, *Radikalisme Islam, Nahdatul Ulama Masa Depan Moderatisme Islam Di Indonesia.* (Yogyakarta: Logung Pustaka, 2007), 33.

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FPI's reluctance to establish an Islamic State appears to be one of the keys to the high support of the Indonesian people for FPI compared to other radical mass organizations<sup>87</sup>. Indonesian society which is known to be tolerant,<sup>88</sup> facilitates the formation of propaganda that the effort to establish an Islamic State is a radical act, and radicals themselves are stigmatized as a negative, provocative act. That is why the understanding of the establishment of an Islamic State is an understanding of the minority in Indonesia.<sup>89</sup>

The form of acceptance of Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) by FPI could be influenced by the sacralization process of the concept of nationalism. In our opinion, the acceptance of Pancasila is merely a slogan to gain public sympathy. It is difficult to accept a declaration of loyalty to Pancasila while demanding the implementation of Sharia law. Shaqiri who quotes Gentile said that since the 19th century, the concept of nationalism has been a political concept that has undergone the greatest process of sacralization when compared to other concepts.<sup>90</sup> Through the sacralization of the concept of nationalism, every group must admit that they are nationalists in order to avoid negative stigma, such as "radical", "extreme", and others.

The fact is, although on various occasions FPI has always claimed to be loyal to Pancasila and NKRI, but there is not a single sentence of loyalty to Pancasila and NKRI in its statutes / ART. Instead of being loyal to Pancasila and NKRI, FPI's vision and mission reads: the *Kaffah* implementation of Islamic *Shari'ah* under the auspices of the *Khilafah Islamiyyah* according to *Manhaj Nubuwwah*, through the implementation of *Da'wah*, enforcement of Hisbah and the practice of Jihad.<sup>91</sup> This vision and mission of FPI was highlighted by the government, and had become a barrier to the issuance of the extension of FPI mass organizations by the government.<sup>92</sup>

FPI claims that the concept of a caliphate that they are promoting is different from the concept of a caliphate which is generally understood as an effort to establish an Islamic State. The *Khilafah* according to FPI is the desire to strengthen the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) by uniting Muslim-majority countries to have the same currency, visa-free,

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<sup>87</sup> Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), *Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), Survei Opini Publik: Toleransi Masyarakat Indonesia (Jakarta: LSI, 7 Agustus 2006), h. 15, 15*; Barton, "The Historical Development of Jihadi Islamist Thought in Indonesia. Edited by Scott Helfstein, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point.," 114.

<sup>88</sup> Barton, "The Historical Development of Jihadi Islamist Thought in Indonesia. Edited by Scott Helfstein, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point.,"; Burhanudin and Dijk, *Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting Images and Interpretations*.; Carnegie, "Countering the (Re-) Production of Militancy in Indonesia: Between Coercion and Persuasion.,"; Rahman, "Menakar Kembali Akar Ideologi Ormas Radikal-Fundamentalisme (Studi Kasus Terhadap Front Pembela Islam (FPI).," 293.

<sup>89</sup> Fealey, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?," 117.

<sup>90</sup> Mexhit Shaqiri, "The Elements of Political Religion in the Post-Conflict Society of Kosovo," *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 18, no. 52 (2019): 112.

<sup>91</sup> "FPI's Memorandum and Article of Association (AD/ART)."

<sup>92</sup> CNN, "Tito Karnavian Sebut Izin FPI Terkendala Visi NKRI Bersyariah.," Nopember 2019.

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unifying educational curricula, and others.<sup>93</sup> In various dialogues in the media, FPI conveyed the concept of the Khilafah in question.<sup>94</sup> FPI's various clarifications on the concept of the Khilafah have still sparked controversy. Constitutional law expert Juanda, for example, said that if the concept of the FPI Khilafah was different from the radicals who wanted to disband the Republic of Indonesia and establish an Islamic State, why was the controversial term Khilafah not just abolished?<sup>95</sup>

However, the content of FPI's vision and mission, according to the author, is an indication of the closeness of FPI's thinking to the radicals in general who dream of the establishment of a caliphate. On one occasion, Ayas, as an FPI activist, admitted that he supported anyone and any group who fought for the upholding of Islamic law. What distinguishes FPI from terrorists in enforcing Islamic law is the method. If FPI does not want to kill fellow Muslims, the terrorists justify all means, including killing Muslims who do not agree with them.<sup>96</sup>

The closeness of FPI to radicals in general is also evident from the belief that the caliphate is a necessity that will come in due time.<sup>97</sup> Moreover, in the concept of Khilafah Islamiyah, FPI strives for it by enforcing *hisbah* and practicing *jihad*.<sup>98</sup> The terms of *hisbah* and *jihad* are terms that are quite identical to the radical Islamic movement. *Hisbah* is generally defined as upholding the truth and fighting wrong doing (*amarna'ruf nahimunkar*) based on religious doctrine (*shari'ah*). In practice, this *hisbah* is conducted by law enforcers, a kind of syari'at police.<sup>99</sup> As for radicalism, Jihad is generally understood as war, even committing suicide bombings, for the sake of upholding Islamic law.<sup>100</sup>

Based on the various considerations above, the form of loyalty to Pancasila and The Republic of Indonesia claimed by FPI is rather difficult to understand, if it is related to their vision and mission. It is a bit difficult to understand, on the one hand, claiming to be loyal to Pancasila, but on the other hand striving for the total upholding of Islamic law. Pancasila, as a constitution as a result of collective agreement (public/profane area), will be confused if it is

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<sup>93</sup> Ayas, Head of Da'wah Department IDF Pekalongan, Former chief of IDF Pekalongan 2003-2018).

<sup>94</sup> Kompas.com, "Langkah Maju, FPI Disebut Sudah Ikrar Setia Kepada Pancasila Dan NKRI," Nopember 2019, <https://nasional.kompas.com>.

<sup>95</sup> Chaerul Umam, "FPI Disarankan Hilangkan Kata Khilafah Islamiyah Agar Diakui Negara.," September 30, 2019, <https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2019/11/30/fpi-disarankan-hilangkan-kata-khilafah-islamiyah-agar-diakui-negara>.

<sup>96</sup> Ayas, Head of Da'wah Department IDF Pekalongan, Former chief of IDF Pekalongan 2003-2018).

<sup>97</sup> Haikal Hasan, "Jubir PA 212: Khilafah Islamiyah, Khilafah Akhir Zaman.," Desember 2019, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CQ4nB\\_IOfIo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CQ4nB_IOfIo).

<sup>98</sup> "FPI's Memorandum and Article of Association (AD/ART)."

<sup>99</sup> Michael Cook, *Forbidding Wrong in Islam*. (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

<sup>100</sup> Abdul Munip, "Buku Jihad Terjemahan Dari Bahasa Arab Dan Potensi Radikalisme Beragama Di Lembaga Pendidikan.," *Cendekia: Jurnal Kependidikan Dan Kemasyarakatan* 15, no. 2 (2017): 175.

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juxtaposed with the transcendental authority of God (private/sacred area). According to Frunza quoted Boldea, the state constitution which is public, should not be disturbed by the private doctrine of religion.<sup>101</sup> Ironically, on several occasions, Rizieq as the head of the FPI stated that the holy verse is above the constitution.<sup>102</sup> According to Bahtiar 2018, a statement like this is a symbolic coup attempt.<sup>103</sup>

Some scholars consider Pancasila Principle I to be pro-Islam because it requires all religions and beliefs in Indonesia to follow the concept of tauhid. For example, Mu'ti and Burhani said that the concept of "God Almighty" in Pancasila is a doctrine that is unconsciously embedded in Indonesian society and causes various acts of intolerance.<sup>104</sup> Moreover, the principle of monotheism in Pancasila has persecuted many local beliefs through accusations of blasphemy. In fact, mainstream religions in Indonesia such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism are "forced" to follow the monotheistic concept of divinity.<sup>105</sup> Steenbrink adds that monotheistic principles which are dominated by the majority religion in Indonesia have suppressed the spiritual wealth of the archipelago.<sup>106</sup>

Although Pancasila especially Principle I, is considered by some scholars to have problems from the aspect of respecting differences, its existence is the result of the agreement of the founding fathers. Pancasila is also called the middle way that bridges the various ideological and religious differences of the nation's children.<sup>107</sup> Therefore, the statement of allegiance to Pancasila by FPI cannot go hand in hand with the demands of implementing *syari'a* in total. Because, the total application of *syari'a* is a form of violation of the collective agreement

Thus, the acknowledgment of loyalty to Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia on the one hand, but still the existence of typical radical terms such as "khilafah" and demands for the total application of *syari'at* on the other is something that is ambivalent. The ambivalence performed by FPI can be seen as a form of "double standards" strategy. The double standard is intended to gain the sympathy of the masses in order to save themselves from the negative stigma of radicals on the one hand, but on the other hand, to keep understanding about diversity, as well as radical movements.

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<sup>101</sup> Iulian Boldea, "Politics and Religion. Challenges and Ideological Openings.," *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 16, no. 47 (2017): 105.

<sup>102</sup> Detik News, "Reuni 212, Habib Rizieq Kembali Bicara 'Ayat Suci Di Atas Ayat Konstitusi.,"" December 2, 2018.

<sup>103</sup> Riza Bahtiar, "Ayat Suci Di Atas Konstitusi: Kudeta Simbolik Habib Rizieq?," Desember 2018, <https://islami.co/ayat-suci-di-atas-konstitusi-kudeta-simbolik-habib-rizieq/>.

<sup>104</sup> Abdul Mu'ti and Najib Burhani, "The Limits of Religious Freedom in Indonesia: With Reference to the First Pillar Ketuhanan Yang MahaEsa of Pancasila.," *Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 9, no. 1 (2019): 111.

<sup>105</sup> Mu'ti and Burhani, 121–22.

<sup>106</sup> Karel Steenbrink, "The Reformasi of Ayu Utami; Attacking the Monopoly of the Great Religions," *Wacana* 15, no. 2 (2014): 355–56.

<sup>107</sup> Abdul Mu'id Aris Shofa, "Memaknai Kembali Multikulturalisme Indonesia Dalam Bingkai Pancasila.," *JPK (Jurnal Pancasila Dan Kewarganegaraan* 1, no. 1 (2016): 38.

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### 5. *FPI and a New Era of Radical Islam in Indonesia*

The escalation of contemporary radical Islamic understanding is seen in educational institutions,<sup>108</sup> the rise of *Shari'ah* Regional Regulations (Perda), as well as the political process in the 2017 DKI Pilkada and the 2019 Presidential Election. The National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas) has reported that since 1999 to 2009, there were 154 *Shari'at* of local regulation which contained elements of discrimination both directly and indirectly against women. Of the 154 local regulations, 19 are at the provincial level, 134 local regulations at the Regency / City level, and 1 local regulation at the Village level. These regional regulations are enforced at 69 local governments at the district / city level and 21 regional governments at the provincial level.<sup>109</sup> Not only Komnas Perempuan, Fanani also claims that the *Syari'ah* regional regulation that has been intensively carried out contains elements of discrimination against women such as restrictions on working in the public sector, how to dress, express themselves and get education, and do not get public services, which is the male equivalent.<sup>110</sup> Some scholars say that the implementation of the *Shari'ah* Regional Regulations is more based on political motives to gain the sympathy of the masses that are predominantly Muslim, rather than the enthusiasm to improve the welfare of the people in the region and secular parties in Indonesia.<sup>111</sup>

The escalation that has caught the attention of various circles is the rise of religious issues in the political process in DKI Jakarta 2017 and the 2019 Presidential Election. In 2017, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), as incumbent Governor, again ran for Governor of Jakarta. After the Al-Maidah case which resulted in a massive and bumpy demonstration demanding the detention of Ahok because he was deemed to have insulted religion, Ahok who came from an ethnic and religious minority (Christian Chinese) was defeated in the DKI Jakarta Regional Election. Initially, almost all survey institutions predicted that Ahok would return to the position of Governor of Jakarta in the second term, due to his various innovations and achievements.<sup>112</sup> The political process that occurred in Jakarta divided society into polarization between nationalists versus religious and liberal versus radicalists.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Dirga Maulana, "Dirga Maulana, 'The Exclusivism of Religion Teachers: Intolerance and Radicalism in Indonesian Public Schools.' *Studia Islamika* 24.2 (2017)," *Studia Islamika* 24, no. 2 (2017).

<sup>109</sup> Komnas Perempuan, *Atas Nama Otonomi Daerah: Pelembagaan Diskriminasi Dalam Tatanan Negara-Bangsa Indonesia* (Jakarta: Komnas Perempuan, 2010), 19.

<sup>110</sup> Fanani, "The Implementation of Sharia Bylaws and Its Negative Social Outcome for Indonesian Women.," 171.

<sup>111</sup> Sukron Kamil et al., *Syariah Islam Dan HAM: Dampak Perda Syariah Terhadap Kebebasan Sipil, Hak-Hak Perempuan, Dan Non-Muslim*. (Jakarta: CRCs UIN Jakarta, 2007).

<sup>112</sup> Tempo.co, "Enam Lembaga Rilis Hasil Survei Pilkada DKI, Ahok Unggul."

<sup>113</sup> Jobpie Sugiharto, "Kaleidoskop 2017: Pilkada Brutal Gubernur DKI Jakarta," Tempo, December 26, 2017, <https://metro.tempo.co/read/1045103/kaleidoskop-2017-pilkada-brutal-gubernur-dki-jakarta>.

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The polarization of society continued in the 2019 Presidential Election. The supporters of Ahok from the moderate Nationalist group were identified with Jokowi supporters, while Anies supporters from the conservative religious groups were identified with Prabowo supporters. As in the DKI Pilkada, various religious issues were also played out in the 2019 Presidential Election. This can be seen in the existence of Ijtima 'Ulama who supports one particular candidate pair, the issue of criminalizing ulama, religious lessons will be abolished if a certain candidate pair wins.<sup>114</sup> It is difficult to argue with the above issues with political content. On the other hand, Jokowi's supporters capitalized on the issue of radicalism, a conservative caliphate that had been negatively stigmatized to attack the opposing camp.

If in the case of the DKI Pilkada, the faction that uses religious issues is able to win the election contestation, in the case of the 2019 Presidential Election, it is precisely those who capitalize on the radicalism issue that win. The effectiveness of using religious issues in the 2017 DKI regional elections could be due to the figure of Ahok who is non-Muslim. This is different from the figure of Jokowi who, although based on the trichotomy of Gertz, can be categorized as abangan (syncretic Islam),<sup>115</sup> Jokowi is still a Muslim. Even so, political events that were so thickly tinged with religious issues led Indonesia to an era of "ideological warfare" between radical Islam versus moderate Islam. Community divisions continued, even though the Presidential Election was over. Attacks and blasphemy, both on social media and other media, continues between moderate Muslims and radical Muslims.<sup>116</sup> This ideological war is, of course, part of the impact of the strengthening of radical Islam in Indonesia.

The rise of understanding of radical Islam in educational institutions, the rise of the *Shari'ah* Regional Regulations, the thickening of religious issues in the 2017 DKI Regional Election and the 2019 Presidential Election, cannot be separated from the role of FPI.<sup>117</sup> The various cases driven by FPI succeeded in building an era which the author calls a new era of the radical Islamic movement in Indonesia.

The dissatisfaction of the Muslim middle class with various problems of the Nation related to poverty, unemployment and other crisis, seems to be one of the factors for the rise of this new era.<sup>118</sup> According to Jati, the middle class spreads into the merchant bureaucrats, the

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<sup>114</sup> Susanto, "Politicization of Religion and the Future of Democracy in Indonesia in Populism Theory."

<sup>115</sup> Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (University of Chicago Press, 1976).

<sup>116</sup> Uswatun Hasanah, "Media Islam Moderat Bersatu Hadapi Kontra Narasi Kelompok Radikal.," August 7, 2019, <https://santrinews.com/Nasional/9250/Media-Islam-Moderat-Bersatu-Hadapi-Kontra-Narasi-Kelompok-Radikal>.

<sup>117</sup> Antara, "PA 212, FPI, Dan GNPF Gelar Ijtima Ulama Pada Agustus 2019.," Sugiharto, "Kaleidoskop 2017: Pilkada Brutal Gubernur DKI Jakarta."

<sup>118</sup> M Slama, *Social Media and Islamic Practice: Indonesian Ways of Being Digitally Pious. Digital Indonesia: Connectivity and Divergence*. (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2017); Wasisto Raharjo Jati, "Dari Umat Menuju Ummah?: Melacak Akar Populisme Kelas Menengah Muslim Indonesia," *Maarif* 12, no. 1 (2017): 28.

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professional class, the intellectual class, and so on. Jati added the spread of the Muslim middle class segment was caused by the modernization of Islamic preaching which prioritized practical aspects rather than matters of theology and *ukhrawi*. Conditions of urgency and socio-economic and socio-political inequality, according to Jati, trigger a search for the same identity, religion, ethnicity, language, etc. as a form of group strengthening. The language of “people” then emerged as a form of collectivity. The people are no longer shown as members of recitation assemblies or Islamic schools, but as a resistance movement in the name of Islam as a symbol.<sup>119</sup>

Even though it has a radical nuance, preaching that prioritizes practical aspects rather than theory as described by Jati above was carried out by FPI. More than that, the people who joined FPI were people who came from various social classes from among traders, academics, some bureaucrats, and even thugs. In addition, people who joined FPI were also people who had actually joined mainstream mass organizations in Indonesia such as NU and Muhammadiyah. They feel dissatisfied with the social problems they see every day, and at the same time their aspirations are not channeled through these mainstream mass organizations.<sup>120</sup> Thus, FPI can become an organization that serves as a port for the Muslim middle class who is nervous about socio-economic pressures. Besides, cultural shock, due to rapid social changes as a result of modernization, could be the reason behind the rise of a new radicalism movement in Indonesia driven by FPI.<sup>121</sup> Moreover, feelings of global injustice and oppression from the West unite them in one forum to fight it.<sup>122</sup>

The propaganda remains loyal to Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia, which was successfully built by FPI, able to save them from the negative stigma of the *radical, terrorists* and so on. Therefore, several decades earlier the radical Islamic movement called Fealy had failed because it had been successfully stigmatized by negative, anti-moderate and so on. However, in the current era, through the double standards implemented, FPI together with other Islamist movements have succeeded in bringing about a new era of the radical Islamic movement in Indonesia.

### **C. Conclusion**

Although Fealy stated that radical Islam in Indonesia was failed, marked by the bankruptcy of their media such as *PanjiMasyarakat* and *Sabili*, radical Islamic thought and

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<sup>119</sup> Jati, “Dari Umat Menuju Ummah?: Melacak Akar Populisme Kelas Menengah Muslim Indonesia,” 28.

<sup>120</sup> Rahman, “Menakar Kembali Akar Ideologi Ormas Radikal-Fundamentalis (Studi Kasus Terhadap Front Pembela Islam (FPI).,”” 294; Ayas, Head of Da’wah Department IDF Pekalongan, Former chief of IDF Pekalongan 2003-2018).

<sup>121</sup> M Ayoob, “Political Islam: Image and Reality,” *World Policy Journal* 21, no. 3 (2004).

<sup>122</sup> Imam Mustofa, “Mustofa, Imam. 2017. ‘Terorisme: Antara Aksi Dan Reaksi (Gerakan Islam Radikal Sebagai Respon Terhadap Imperealisme Modern).’ *Religia* 15(1): 83,” *Religia* 15, no. 1 (2017): 83.

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movements continued to develop. The development of radical Islam can be seen in, the rise of syari'at regulations, in the 2017 DKI Pilkada and the 2019 Presidential Election.

The development of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia in the contemporary context is more or less influenced by the FPI movement. Cultural shocks, economic pressure, global injustice, disillusionment with socio-cultural conditions have made the public depend their hopes on FPI to bring change. In addition, the double standard of FPI by claiming to be loyal to Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia on the one hand, but often taking radical actions on the other, has brought Indonesia to the Ideological Battle. This era was marked by the splitting of society between moderate Islam and radical Islam, which blasphemed one another. This era also marked a new era of the radical Islamic movement in Indonesia.

This paper contributes to providing information on the development of the latest radical Islamic strategies and movements, especially those carried out by FPI. This paper also describes the complexities behind the occurrence of radical Islam. Social, political, economic aspects can be a picture of all parties in seeing the phenomenon of the development of radical Islam. That way, de-radicalization efforts can also be carried out comprehensively, not only relating to religious aspects. However, this research has shortcomings, in the form of a lack of detailed data related to social, economic, political aspects of the development of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia. This is an opening for further research related to the dimensions of the social, economic, political dimensions behind the development of the radical Islamic movement.

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